The Decision of the Supreme Court

I was pleased by the decision of the Supreme Court regarding the detainees at GTIMO. Since that program began I have been troubled by the term enemy combatants. As a soldier the term held no meaning--as it was neither a POW or a prisoner. Our nation policies regarding the detainees at GTIMO has been misguided from the beginning and has done more to damage our standing in the world. Whilst the Constitution gives the President the responsibility of being Commander in Chief, it clearly states in Article I, Section 8 that Congress has the power to make rules regarding enemy prisoners. The Court affirmed the checks and balances of our founders and affirmed the Constitution must stand as a bulwark against arbitrary and capricious actions.

How Private are Bank Records

I am not sure that anyone should be getting their panties in a knot over the possibility of the government reviewing bank records. The transfer of money has never been private, and by looking for patterns, particularly when waging a war on terror, those patterns may help our government and other governments stop potential terrorist acts.

Review of Supreme Command

This was written in November 2002.

Supreme Command; Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, Eliot A. Cohen, The Free Press, New York, New York, 2002, 288 pages.


A quick read of the Washington Post or The New York Times in recent weeks and months will see quite often the name of Eliot A. Cohen. Mr. Cohen is an academic. He has experience both as a reserve military officer and a former political appointee in the Department of Defense. He is the favorite academic of his mentor Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfweitz and his boss Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and other members of the neo-conservative cabal who advise President Bush. Mr. Cohen work on the relationship between the military and civilian leadership is a must read by all who wish to profess a knowledge of current military thought and strategy. His work, somewhat modeled on Gerhardt Ritter’s seminal work on the relationship between the German General Staff and the Kaiser, The Sword and the Scepter, will never achieve that works reputation for heft and breath of scholarship and analysis.
Mr. Cohen’s thesis is that the proper relationship between the civil and military is one of which the military is subservient to civil authority. He cites as his examples Lincoln’s relationship with the Union Army in the Civil War, Clemenceau relationship with the French Army in World War I, Churchill’s relationship with the British Army in World War II, and finally David Ben Gurion’s relationship with the Israeli General Staff in the 1948 War for Independence. While one in theory would like to agree that at all times and in all places the military should be totally subservient to civil authority, reality, pragmatic common sense and experience have demonstrated time and time again it is balance between military and civil authority which achieves success.
In each of the examples cited by Mr. Cohen, the civilian leader was forced by circumstance to impose his will onto the actions of the military to ensure the survival of his nation. Lincoln actions of bolstering the military, providing grand strategy, and creating the political conditions for success guaranteed the survival of the United States. Clemenceau rose to power after the failure of Anglo French military strategy, revolution in the ranks over the lack of leadership by Senior French Officers, and the fear among French politicians that without change, France would soon follow Russia into the abyss of revolution. Churchill became Prime Minister at a time when the forces of the United Kingdom had been routed from continental Europe, and were being attacked throughout the empire. Britain stood alone, as the United States was not committed to war. Churchill was forced to ensure that the United Kingdom could survive until such time as a grand coalition could be formed to defeat the menace of Germany—survival required that the British Military be forced to do what they believed was impossible. David Ben Gurion offers an example of the civilian leader whose actions ensure not only the survival of Israel, but who brought together the disparate parts of the Zionist resistance movement to form a cohesive and effective military.
In using these examples, Mr. Cohen has created a model for civil military relationships, in which the experience, the professionalism, and cultural mores of the uniformed military are ignored in favor of desires of the transient political leadership of military. The model offered by Mr. Cohen, is a model which works well in time of crisis but seeks to alienate the uniformed military from the society it is sworn to serve.
What then should be the relationship between civil and military authority. This is a question for which Eliot Cohen has offered one model. While Cohen alludes to the various models of civil military relations, it is worth noting that his model; when carried out by civilian leaders of ability but who lack the necessary leadership skills or whose judgment is shaped by narrow political desires; these civilian leaders can lead the military down an ill conceived path of destruction. There are two examples of where this model has failed the state; Hitler’s rise to power in World War II, and the management style of Robert Strange McNamara in the 1960’s, in which the United States Military was destroyed on the altar of political expediency. This is not however to argue for a military which dominates civil authority, for as Gerhardt Ritter showed in the Sword and Scepter, when this happens the military will lead civil authority down a road ending in the destruction of the state.
What then is the proper relationship between civil and military authority. This is a question, which philosophers have debated for years. John Locke, in his 2nd Treatise on Government—set forth a model of government and the military being subservient to the will of the people. Locke’s perspective was that of a country Whig, who wish to no repeat of the disasters caused by either the inept leadership of civil and military authority as occurred under the House of Stuart or draconian leadership of Cromwell’s Commonwealth. Locke’s 17th Century view of the proper relationship between civil and military authority is discussed in light of the American experience by Madison and Hamilton in the Federalists Papers.
The essence of this model is balance. Balance between the need for the military to be subservient to civil authority, and the need for civil authority to recognize that the members of the military are not only professionals but also fellow citizens, whose allegiance like all citizens is to the Constitution and the Nation. The best examples of that relationship are found in the leadership of both Roosevelt’s and of Ronal Reagan. Each these men clearly had a vision of what was best for the nation, and each clearly understood that the military had not only a constitutional but a moral obligation to support their vision, however each allowed the military to bring to bear their professional judgment, their understanding of their institutions, and their experience to shape the course of military strategy.
The relationship, as described by Forrest Pogue in his multi-volume biography of George C. Marshall, between Marshall and Franklin D. Roosevelt offers, in my opinion the best example of the proper balance between civil and military authority.
In Marshall, Roosevelt the supreme politician, found his equal. Marshall was apolitical and therefore not a threat to the reign of FDR, however he was a supreme staff officer and was not afraid to give his honest opinion on matters of concern. Roosevelt was also served by his other appointments during World War II, Leahy offered an individual who was admire by all in the military, King while caustic nevertheless was the right man to rebuilt the U. S. Navy after the debacle at Pearl Harbor, and Vandergrift rewarded a true warrior, gentleman, and hero for his service, but it was Marshall who held that special place and who set the tone for the civil military relations during World War II. Marshall never an intimate of Roosevelt, the one time which Roosevelt attempted to breach the fine line between a Commander in Chief and a subordinate, Marshall forcefully but quietly and with dignity let it be know what the proper relationship was. In doing this he made it clear that he and the military were subordinate to civil authority, were not to be treated as political hacks, and that their advice and consent was an important part in formulating the grand strategy of World War II. From then on, Roosevelt relied on the good judgment of George C. Marshall, who among all military officers in World War II was the first among equals in Roosevelt’s mind.
Having said all of this, I must wonder if Eliot Cohen’s conclusions were shaped by the desires of his mentor Paul Wolfweitz and his boss Donald Rumsfeld to reshape the military. Cohen’s analysis has been cited by some of the neo-conservative cabal as justification for Donald Rumsfeld draconian actions in reining in the power of the Joint Staff, the Service Chiefs, and to some extent the Combatant Commanders. Whether or not this was just a matter of timing or whether it was consciences decision, nevertheless Mr. Cohen’s book and thesis has served as a basis for the domination of American military by the civilian leadership. The question is whether it was necessary, and whether or not this book and the underlying philosophy are merely means for the justification by political appointees for certain actions. That remains to be seen.

Henry J. Foresman, Jr.; Friday, November 29, 2002
Lieutenant Colonel, Army National Guard of the United States

The Army in Crisis, One Soldiers Perspective
By LTC Henry J. Foresman, Jr.



It is clear, given recent developments inside the beltway, the current administration, is dissatisfied with the direction of the United States Army. Two developments, within the last week, have sent a strong message that the cultural mindset of the United States Army is out of step with the transformation mindset of the Department of Defense. The first development was the leaking of the intention of the Secretary of Defense, to appoint as the next Commander in Chief Europe (CINCEUR) (who is dual hated as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe) the incumbent Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. While the current CINCEUR (SACEUR) is a an Air Force Officer, during the last fifty years all but two of the CINCEUR (SACEUR) have been from the United States Army.

The second development was the leaking of the intention of the Secretary of Defense the name of the next Chief of Staff of the Army, General John Keane, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. The current Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki has over a year remaining as Chief of Staff. The fact the Secretary of Defense has made this decision and it has been leaked to the press, is a clear signal to the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the United States Army, the Secretary of Defense has lost confidence in the leadership and direction of the United States Army.

What has happened to the United States Army in the ten years since Desert Storm? Why does it find itself in a crisis of self? How can it regain it direction and how can it regain the trust and confidence of Secretary of Defense and once again become a leader with in the Department of Defense? I am not sure I have the answer, but I shall give perspective, based on twenty five years of service in the United States Army and the Army National Guard.

During the Cold War, it was the Army that was going to provide the bulk of the defense of Western Europe in support of NATO. The United States Army was focused on Europe and developed a Eurocentric mindset. It tactics, and its weapons systems were geared towards stopping the Soviet Union in a pitch battle on the plains of Europe. Desert Storm, while not on the plains of Europe, was a vindication of the Army’s vision and developments in weapons systems and doctrine since the end of World War II. The centerpiece of the Army was the Armored and Mechanized Infantry Divisions, with their ability to deliver deadly and accurate direct fires, provide deadly and responsive indirect fires, and to attack the enemy deep with Attack Helicopters. While the Army has always maintained a balance between light and heavy forces, it was the heavy force, from which the leaders of the Army emerged. The light forces, while capable in low and mid intensity conflict, and in the case of airborne units possessed capability of forced entry operations, they offered very little in the conduct of heavy combat.

Since the end of the Cold War and the victories in the Gulf, the Army has been searching for direction. It has held to its Euro-centric mindset, despite the fact that its potential adversaries are not in Europe but in the Near East and Asia. It has maintained its heavy forces, and has continued the development of weapons systems linked to fighting the Cold War adversary of the Soviet Union. The current Chief of Staff, General Shinseki has proposed and has pushed the transformation of the Army to a lighter and more mobile force, capable of force projection to any place in the World within ninety six hours. Rather than pushing a radical agenda of reshaping the Army now, he has proposed a more cautious and fiscally prudent course, which will transform a part of the Army while maintaining the so called “legacy” force as the Army develops the so called objective force. While I have applauded General Shinseki vision, he unfortunately in being cautious has damaged the Army. More importantly, he has failed to bring the Army along with his vision. In many cases, the entrenched bureaucracies of the Army Staff, and unwillingness of other leaders in the Army to embrace change have damaged his transformation.

As mentioned, the Army still intends to field weapons systems in the future which are Cold War legacies. The Crusader gun system is a prime example. An advanced field artillery system, while providing enhanced digital and fire on the move capability, in order to ensure crew survivability, it is a 40 ton monster. While it has some enhanced capabilities it does not increase the range which a 155MM artillery round can be fired. In that category it is on par with current field artillery systems,. Since the 1980’s the Army has had the MLRS, a tracked mounted Rocket Artillery system. Since the 1980’s the light Infantry Community has wanted a similar capability—a capability which will not be field until 2006, if then. The Army is currently fielding digitalized improved versions of the M1A1 Abrams and M2A1 Bradley in the III United States Army Corps. While greatly improving the ability of Commander’s at all levels to visualize the battlefield, the III Corps is unable to operate with other non digitalized units or units of other services.

No greater example exists of the Army’s inability to chart future visions, than in its Aviation modernization. In the last five years, the Army has had at least five different aviation modernization plans. In each case in has succumbed to either money or parochial infighting within the service. Army aviation is broken. It has an aging fleet, and the Army has not developed a vision for how to maintain that fleet, and to ensure it ability to fight and win the nations wars. Because of the lack of vision, the Reserve components, which make up fifty percent of the Army’s combat power, find themselves without attack aviation or air cavalry assets in its Divisions, and find itself without the sufficient assault and lift helicopters to perform their war time missions? The Army has hung its aviation star on the Comanche, which will combine the role of attack helicopter and scout helicopter in one airframe. This aircraft, is one variant or another, has been under development since 1983. In almost twenty years, the Army has not fielded this aircraft, nor will it be fielded until 2010. Almost thirty years to develop and field and aircraft is beyond comprehension. While the Army is seeking to maintain the technological and aircraft superiority, that the aircraft in the 1980’s gave it, it has failed to articulate a vision of what that aircraft is to do. The Comanche, while without a doubt one of the most technological advance aircraft in the world, was designed to fight the heavy tank centric battles of the Cold war. What the Army needs is helicopters, primarily lift and heavy lift which can move large numbers of troops and equipment around the battlefields of the third world. Battlefields that are not the flat plains of Europe or the deserts of the Middle East but rather the jungles of Asia and Africa, the mountainous terrain of Central Asia and Korea, the large, uninhabited deserts of Saharan Africa. These are the regions of the world where the battles of today and tomorrow will be fought.

While I do not subscribe to David Hackworth’s thesis that the leadership of the Army is rotten to the core, that they are Perfumed Princes; however, I do believe, he is correct that the Army has not rewarded those who are not bold, audacious, or even controversial. Case in point is what has happened to Colonel Doug MacGregor, who wrote a book on how to transform the Army, Breaking the Phalanx, unfortunately for Colonel MacGregor because his book questioned many long held beliefs in the Army, he threatened too many rice bowls and his career has been effectively sidetracked. Instead of putting in a position to Command an ACR or Brigade, he has been given a series of Staff Positions which will effectively prevent him from making General Officer. His sin was being forward looking, suggesting a new path for the Army and as such he was branded a heretic.

The problem facing the Army is not unlike what was faced by General George C. Marshall at the beginning of his tenure as Chief of Staff. What he found was an Army of entrenched thinking. It was said about many of the General’s and Senior Colonels in the Army in 1939, the last original thought they had was when they signed their name on the matriculation roll at West Point (Texas AM, VMI, Citadel take your pick). No greater example of this staid thinking which Marshall had to contend with was the belief among the Horse Cavalry that the Horse Cavalry was a viable weapon, despite what happened in World War I, the Spanish Civil War, and happened in Poland on the day he assumed the position of Chief of Staff. It was the Horse Cavalry community who delayed and prevented the Army from mechanizing between the wars (as well as Congress and their cheap approach to national security). The Horse Cavalry was determined they were going to prevent the Armor community from becoming the leading branch in the Army. George Marshall handled the problem deftly; he thanked the Colonel Bimp’s and General Idiots for their service, and sent them into retirement.

While the Army leadership often talks about “thinking outside the box” the truth is that the Army wants leaders who conform to the prevailing mindset. They want leaders whose approaches to leadership are down the middle and do not deviate from the cultural norms of the Army culture. They dare not be rebels, or different in any way. The day of an Officer being promoted to higher grades who has a mustache or has a reputation as a hard drinking, hard charging, skirt chasing, hell raising, warrior is gone. (I would argue that this is not a sexists comment, for there are officers of both sexes who meet this criteria, except for the female officer it would be pant chasing.)

Back to World War II, George Marshall, was dull, and led, by all accounts a very staid, right and proper life, however that did not preclude him for appointing as Senior Commander’s Officers whose activities were the very opposite of Marshall’s persona. George Patton, Vinegar Joe Stillwell, Douglas MacArthur, Hap Arnold, Dick Sunderland, and many others had eccentrics of character which would today discredit them from higher level command. Marshall’s golden rule was discretion is the better part of valor, therefore and officers who were discrete in their extracurricular activities were acceptable, however if a General Officers action became public knowledge it would cost them, either in a delay in promotion or early retirement.

This is not say the United States Army needs every officer to be a wander, lush, or general reprobate, but it does not hurt to have a few who live on the edge. General Don Starry, had a reputation of being a hard charging, swaggering Cavalryman, who was not afraid to speak his mind and ruffle a few feathers. Likewise, it was LTG Hank Emerson, whom the Army entrusted the responsibility of turning the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea around after it was disseminated by the Vietnam war was by all accounts a hard living Airborne Infantryman. For every Don Starry or Hank Emerson there is a Fred Franks, or Hugh Shelton who labor quietly without fanfare, but who left a positive mark on the Army.

Perhaps with a little greater intellectual rigor on the part of our General Officers then maybe we would have less group think. Who knows, maybe a few rebels will work their way to the top.

Written in 2001

Abuses By Congress

This is a very personnel post. . .my baby brother George, who is a member of the Bush Sub Cabinet was the guest of honor at the his ritualistic burning at the stake by Congress yesterday. Congressmen do have a reason to be outraged when something is screwed up, but here their concerns were very narrow and parochial it involved how much money New York City and Washington DC were going to get for preparing for the worst. My brother, I am sure handled the burning at the stake well, but for me this is another example of the problem with Congress. Rather than trying to understand, to govern, to fix problems they would rather grandstand and mug for the cameras. I am not handling it so well—as I am mad, as it is my baby brother who was burned at the stake.

Commandant Designee of the USMC

I have never met Lieutenant General Conway, the Commandant Designee of the USMC, however I have particpated in numerous VTC in which he was a participant. One never gets the impression he has anything but a steel rod in his spine, however he never fails to treat all with grace and dignity. A rare trait among senior officers. His reputation in the USMC is outstanding. I believe he is a worthy successor to those who have held the position before him.

Reserve Component Reform

Reforming the United States Army Reserve Components?
by COL Henry J. Foresman, Jr.
Section 1: Background

As part of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Guard Bureau, a Joint Bureau of the Department of the Army, and Department of the Air Force was created. Prior to the National Security Act of 1947, the National Guard Bureau had existed as a Bureau of the Department of War, its purpose was to provide training guidance and logistical oversight for Army National Guard units in each state and territory. Since the Dick Act of 1906 and the National Security Act of 1921 the United States Army had two Reserve Components; the Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve. The United States Army Reserve was created initially to provide Reserve Medical personnel for the Army in time of war, however because the Reserve, unlike the Army National Guard was not under the peacetime control of the Governors of the respective states and territories, the Regular Army over time expanded the size of the United States Army Reserve to include the full range of forces and capabilities found in the Regular Army and the Army National Guard. By creating the USAR the Regular Army hoped to create a force that more responsive to the needs of the Department of War and less influenced by partisan politics. The Army National Guard, through its lobbing organization, the National Guard Association of the United States, ensured that its supporters in Congress made it the dominant Reserve Component force in the United States Army. In the years between World War I and World War II, while there was little money for the military, the Army National Guard Association always ensured they got some equipment, whereas the United States Army Reserve often was undermanned and lacked any equipment to train with for their wartime mission.
In recent years the Army has had to rely increasingly on both the Army National Guard and United States Army Reserve as a source of manpower for a variety of military missions first in the Balkans, both in Bosnia and Kosovo; and now in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because of the large number of National Guard forces deployed some Governors have publicly complained that these deployments have left their states ill prepared to respond to state emergencies such as forest fires and natural disasters.
In the ongoing conflict in Iraq, the Army would not have been able to sustain the rotation of combat forces if it had not been for the combat formations of the Army National Guard, or sustain the fight without the combat support and combat service support from both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. But this has been painful as it required the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of citizen soldiers, disrupting their lives and it has involved massive expenditures of money and resources to train and outfit these units so they were on par with the Regular Army. It has not been without friction and there are those in the Regular Army who are already beginning the whisper campaign to strip the Army National Guard of all the combat formation and to put them in Regular Army. Whilst this is not likely to happen there will be a period following Iraq in which fingers are pointed and tempers lost over a debate that has gone on since the founding of our nation.
Section 2: Purpose
Rather than debating what is not possible, for Congress will never allow the Army to be large enough to accommodate all the combat formations in the Regular Army nor will the American people allow this to happen because of the historical ethos of distrust of large standing Armies. Rather, we should debate how to structure the Reserve Components to best support the national security of our nation. The purpose of this paper is to set forth a proposal for reform of the Reserve Components in the United States Army. It is radical paradigm shift from the present and both the National Guard Association and the Reserve Officers Association of the United States will be uncomfortable with it.
Section 3: Reform of the Army Reserve Components
In approaching reform of the Army Reserve Components, one must remember that for good or ill, the drafters of the Constitution, required that each state be allow a militia. The question which must be asked is how to accomplish reform of the Reserve Components of the United States Army so they are not only responsive to the Federal Government but also remain responsive to the needs of the respective states.
My proposal is very simple. We create two categories of militia, Federal and State, which is really no different than what exists today, but rather than having a Director of the Army National Guard reporting to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Chief of Staff of the United States Army and a Chief of Army Reserve who reports to the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, there will have a Director of Federal Militia (equivalent of the Chief of the Army Reserve) and a Director of the State Militia (equivalent of the Director of the Army National Guard). Both would report to the Chief of the Army National Guard Bureau who would report only to the Chief of Staff of the Army. While I have confined my discussion to the Army, a concurrent reform would be required in the United States Air Force along with a major rewrite of Title 10 and 32 United States Code in order to streamline the bureaucracy. My proposal, in effect would do away with the National Guard Bureau as it is know today, and constitute only an Army National Guard Bureau. My personnel belief is that with the Air Force a similar reorganization should take place but rather than referring to it as the Air National Guard Bureau all Air Force Reserve Components would be constituted in the United States Air Force Reserve.
The figure below is my take on how the Chief of the Army National Guard Bureau and associated Staff should be organized. Under the current system there are four distinct staffs in support of the Army Reserve Components; the National Guard Bureau (with representatives of both the Army and Air National Guard), the Army National Guard Staff, the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, and the United States Army Reserve Command. Under my reorganization, four staffs would be reduced to three. The Chief of the Army National Guard Bureau staff would combine the functions currently found in National Guard Bureau and the Chief of the Army Reserve. The current OCAR staff, USARC staff, and Army National Guard (Title 10) staffs would form the Staffs of the Director of Federal Militia and Director of State Militia. In order to bring functionality and synchronization to these staff, the Staffs associated with the Chief of the Army National Guard Bureau would be located at a military installation in close proximity to Washington DC. Ideal candidates would be Fort A. P. Hill, or Ft. Belvoir in Virginia and Fort Meade in Maryland.

Figure 1: Organization of the Army National Guard
Section 4: Composition of the Militias
Federal Militia:

The Federal militia would be organized identically to Active Component TO&E or TDA units. The types of units found in the Federal militia would be those required to support contingency or sustained military operations at all levels.:
· All Combat Army Formations (Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Attack Aviation, and Combat Engineers.)
· 50% of the Combat Heavy Engineers and non-construction EN units
· All Combat Divisions (UEx) Headquarters and Staffs
· Special Operations Forces
· Military Intelligence Units
· All MP IR and 50% of the MP Combat Support Units
· 50 % of the Assault Aviation, Medical Evacuation, and Heavy Lift Aviation
· All Forward Surgical Teams, Combat Support Hospitals and other critical medical assets
· All Sustainment Units of Action Headquarters for Division and Corps (UEx) and Army Headquarters (UEy)
· Civil Affairs
· PSYOPS
· 100% of the Simulation Units and 50% of the Training Units; Training Divisions would remain in the Federal Militia
· 75% of the Signal Assets
· 50% of the NBC Assets
· 25 % of the AG, Postal, and Finance Assets
· 50 % of the Transportation Assets
· 50% of QM assets

State Militia:
The State militia units would also be organized identically to Active Component TO&E and TDA units. The types of units found in the State Militia would give the respective Governors the maximum “Bang for the Buck” in responding to state emergencies or providing support to the Federal Government for natural or other disasters. (One of the provisions of any changes to Title 10 and 32 would include provisions for using units outside their home states to support natural or other disaster efforts in a State Militia status (equivalent to the current Title 32 status.)
· 50% of the Training Units
· 75% of the AG, Postal, and Finance Assets
· 50% of the Transportation Assets
· 50 % of the QM assets
· 50% of the NBC Assets
· 25 % of the Signal Assets
· All non critical medical assets
· 50 % of the Assault Aviation, Medical Aviation, and Heavy Lift Aviation
· 50% of the MP CS assets
· All State Headquarters (STARCS)
· Construction Engineers and other Engineer units such as utility detachments, utility detachments etc
· 50% Training Units
Section 5: Command and Control of the Militia
As structured today, the Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve have distinct Command and Control entities. The Army National Guard units answer to their respective State Adjutant General and receive support through the Joint Headquarters State. The United States Army Reserve receives its support through Regional Readiness Commands or Direct Reporting Units. Regardless of whether it is a Joint Headquarters State or Regional Readiness Command or Direct Reporting Unit, the functions of these headquarters are essentially the same.
In order to streamline Command and Control and Support for the Army National Guard, each State Adjutant General will exercise exclusive Command and Control over the State Militia (except when federalized) and will provide Title 10 support to both the Federal and State Militias in that State. The Senior Commander of Federal Militia forces in a State will exercise Command and Control over the Federal Militia. In order to make this palatable to Active Component, this will require that each Adjutant General be Federally Recognized as a General Officer who may be a retired Army General Officer or a member eligible to be nominated as a General Officer in the Federal militia. The TAG while Federally recognized will be the only General Officer in each respective states militia. It will require that requirements for promotions, assignments, etc for both the Federal and State militia be exactly the same. While the respective states have a Constitutional right to appoint their officers in order to ensure standardization and compliance with Statutory Law and Regulatory guidance promotions and assignments must be made by common criteria. By centralizing the so called “Title 10” responsibilities under one headquarters it should eliminate duplication of effort, and provide efficiencies of effort and fiscal discipline for both the Federal and State militia.
There are currently two separate and distinct systems for managing Reserve Component soldiers. Any reform must streamline management of Reserve Component soldiers, both officer and enlisted. First and foremost every soldier will be enlisted in the Army National Guard of the United States; those who chose to enter the State Militia force will have a dual enlistment, just as those in the National Guard have today. For those in the Federal Militia they will have the option of being enlisted in the inactive State Militia. This will enable soldiers in either the Federal or State Militia to transfer from one militia to the other. All soldiers regardless of whether they are in the Federal or State Militia will be supported by the “State Headquarters.” The State Headquarters will be responsible for paying, promoting, and processing personnel actions, it will provide clothing and equipment, and will be responsible for managing the training, mobilization, demobilization, and recruiting of both the Federal and State militia. It should improve efficiency and responsiveness for all soldiers regardless of whether they are in the Federal or State Militia.
The Adjutant General’s being Federally Recognized, will still be subject to the appointment of the Governor of their respective state, however minimal qualification will be established to ensure that only those who are qualified are appointed to this position. TAGs will continue to be paid by their respective states, however because they are Federally Recognized General Officers they will be held responsible to ensure that the members of both the Federal and State militias are properly supported. Furthermore upon promotion to General Officer State Militia Officers (except for the TAG) shall be automatically transferred to the Federal Militia. All General Officer Billets in the State Militia, except for the TAG will be coded to be filled only by a Federal Militia General Officer.
Below is how the Command and Control should look, what needs to be empathized is while TAGs will be responsible for support to the Federal Militia they will not have Command authority over the Federal Militia unless so directed by the President of the United States.

Figure 2: Command and Control
Section 6: Readiness, Training and Mobilization
By creating a Federal and State Militia force, the Army will be able to establish priorities for Readiness Levels and Training for Federal and State militia units and ensure that each unit is properly trained and equipped to perform their primary mission.
Organization, Equipping, and Full Time Manning:
Those units in the Federal Militia would be resourced and authorized manning at C1; they would be equipped with the same equipment as the Regular Army and would routinely conduct training exercises with Active Components units. Federal Militias would be authorized 100% of Full Time Manning, which will be sourced by Active Guard and Reserve Soldiers. Within the Federal Militia there would be no military technicians.
Those units in the State Militia would be resourced and authorized manning no higher than C2 but no lower than C3. State militia units would be equipped with comparable equipment as the Regular Army and would not normally conduct training exercises with Active Component units. The State militia would be authorized 80% (C2) of their Full Time manning which would be sourced exclusively by military technicians. The State Headquarters in each State would be exclusive manned, with the exception of the Statutory Position of United States Property and Fiscal Officer with military technicians.
Readiness and Training:
Since the end of the Gulf War, the United States Army has been required by Statue to provide enhanced Training advisors to the Reserve Components. Commonly referred to as “Title 11” duty it has required the program personnel to support the Reserve Components. Clearly these individuals are enhanced the readiness of the Reserve Components but at a cost to the Active Component. Given the Operational Tempo which the Army is experiencing, there needs to clearly be a better way of ensuring that the RC are properly trained and advised.
The model which the Army should consider is what is currently used by the United States Marine Corps. Rather than creating separate and distinct units, the Army should assign Active Component Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers to actual positions within the Federal Militia. For example in each of the Federal Militia Brigade Combat Teams, the Deputy Commander would be an active component Colonel, he would be assisted by other active component officers who were assigned to each BCT both at the Brigade Headquarters and also in each of the Battalions. But there would be a trade off—for each active component Soldier assigned to the BCT, an Active Guard and Reserve soldier or Drilling member of the Unit on an extended tour of Active Duty would be assigned to the same position in an Active Component BCT. This would ensure that the Active Component was engaged in the Training and Readiness of the Federal Militia, but more importantly by requiring Federal Militia soldiers to be assigned against Active Component position would expose the Federal Militia to the best in the Army and would help the Army learn something about the strengths of the Reserve Components.
Over time this infusion of Active Component Soldiers into the Federal Militia should result in better overall training, readiness of soldiers and equipment, and should ensure that at all levels of the Federal Militia the units are trained and ready to conduct their mission. This will have a corresponding effect on the amount of time a unit requires upon mobilization before they deploy in support of military operations..
The State Militia, the Army should continue to provide some training and readiness oversight to ensure they are prepared to support both Homeland Security and State and Federal Emergency Response missions. The State Militia would not normally be mobilized for missions other than either Homeland Security or Emergency Response missions.
This is not to say they could never be mobilized to support military operations. They could, but only when all the Federal Militia assets had been exhausted. Additionally when mobilizing a State Militia unit, the Department of the Army would have to designate a like or comparable unit as a replacement for the mobilized State Militia unit and transfer the Federal Militia from the Federal Militia to the State Militia. This would apply to all types of Federal Militia units except for Combat Arms—as Combat Army units would always remain under the Direct Command and Control of the Department of the Army through the Army National Guard Bureau and the Director of the Federal Militia.
Mobilizing:
In determining what units of the Federal Militia should be mobilized and to provide some predictability for its members, the Federal Militia should be organized into groupings of Force Packages. Each of the force packages would contain and equal distribution of units found in the Federal Militia and would ensure that in a given year the Federal Militia could provide the numbers and types of units required by the Army for mobilization.
In addition to providing predictability Force Packages would assist commanders in prioritizing training for their units. The example below is based on a model of eight years. This is an arbitrary number it could be any number that was agreed upon by the Chief of the Army National Guard Bureau and the United States Army.

Figure 3: One Example of Predictable Deployment Cycle
Section 7: Why the Change?
Under Donald Rumsfeld the watchword inside the Department of Defense has been transformation. The United States Army, beginning during the tenure of General Eric Shinseki and accelerating under the tenure of General Peter Schoomaker, is undergoing the most profound transformation since World War II. The goal of this transformation is to shape the Army to be more “operational flexibility and adaptability—attributes of Army forces with balanced capabilities. It requires Army forces to sustain a consistently high readiness level. There will be no time to “ramp up” to meet a crisis. Maintaining this readiness level while fighting the War on Terrorism requires a long-term commitment—of both resources and will—by the Nation as well as the Army. These differences form the basis of today’s challenge.”[1] Clearly the bifurcated Reserve Component structure which served the United States Army well during the Cold War needs to be changed. By having a majority of the forces of the Reserve Component under the control of the Governor’s of the respective states is neither efficient nor responsive. It denies the Army the ability to provide the necessary Command oversight to ensure the force is ready. But our Constitution demands that a part of the militia remain under the control of the Governors of the respective states. It demands that a Force tailored to support the types of emergencies most likely to confront the States be available to the Governors. Clearly transformation demands that the structure of the Reserve Components be examined and a new paradigm for the twenty-first century be considered.
What I have proposed does that—is simplifies the Command and Control of the Federal Militia giving the Regular Army more oversight and influence in its readiness and training but at the same time provides the Governor’s the types of forces they will need in State Emergencies and the types of units most useful to the Federal Government in situation similar to Hurricane Katrina. As we have seen in the recent weeks, with the events of Hurricane Katrina, the need for dedicated forces to respond to state level emergency has not lessened and in some respects given the growth of our nation in urban clusters it may become more imperative in the years ahead.
This is a radical solution and will not necessarily sit well with those who wish to preserve the Status Quo Ante Bellum. September 11, 2001 fundamentally alter the world as we knew it. The nations need for a dedicate force to support the United States military has increased as we have taken the war against Global Terrorism to both Afghanistan and Iraq; but the United States need for a force to respond to attack such as September 11, 2001 or natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina has not diminished. What I have proposed will ensure that our nation has an Army Reserve Component force that can properly do both missions.


Author Note: This is a conceptual plan that will require a great deal more work to flesh out the ideas and to identify the second and third order consequences. I believe the time is right, given the discussions at the most recent National Governor’s conference to address these fundamental issues. Preserving the Status Quo is fine as long as the Status Quo gives the nation what it needs, if it does not then we must look to change—I believe current system is failing the nation and that change is warranted.
[1] United States Army, Field Manual 1, 14 June 2005, p. 1-10.

5 Good Books on the Military

I believe these are the five most important books one can read regarding contemporary military history:

1. The Guns of August, Barbara Tuchman
2. The General's War, Gordon and Trainor
3. Cobra II, Gordon and Trainor
4. Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife, Jon Nagl
5. The Four Volume Marshall Biography by Forest Pogue, in particular, VOL II on how Marshall reformed the Army prior to and at the start of World War II

The Revolt of the Generals

Authors Note: I wrote this in April 2006 and reflects my thoughts then and now.

For the last several days I have pondered what the media has dubbed the "Revolt of the Generals." The whole discussion surrounding the propriety of retired senior military officers speaking out on Iraq has generated a host of opinions from both the right and left, supportive and non-supportive, regarding their actions.
It seems to me there are two essential questions which must be answered regarding the comments of the Generals. First, what freedom of dissent do the military posses while on active duty, and second, upon retirement or discharge do former members of the military enjoy the full exercise of liberty conferred by citizenship.
Clearly our founding father's envisioned that the military would be subordinate to the rule of the civil magistrates. In Article II, of the United States Constitution, the President is declared to be the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. While no President since Washington has marched at the head of a military formation, all Presidents since him have exercised a certain flair for wrapping themselves in the mantle of the military. Be it Franklin Roosevelt's naming his sons as military aides or Ronald Reagan saluting the Marine Crewmen of Marine One. Today, as it has been the custom for a number of years, bachelor military officers in Washington are pressed into service as social aides at the White House.
Likewise the founders of our nation wisely gave the power to regulate the Armed Forces to the Congress of the United States. Congress has the exclusive power to approve commissions and promotions of officers, to appropriate money, and to make the necessary laws governing the armed forces.
But the founders were also deeply distrustful of both Central Government and a large standing military. To prevent a possible collusion between the government and the military, or domination of the government by the military the states were empowered to maintain militias under the control of the respective Governor's as a bulwark against military rule.
I mention the above facts not to show my knowledge of our Constitution, or the learned principals which underpin the Constitution and the founders thought, but rather to show the tradition of control and subordination of the military to the civil magistrates.
But, our theory and practice are all together opposite. It was not until the end of the 19th Century that the United States military adopted the professional ethos that the military should be apolitical. Throughout the 19th Century it was not uncommon for military officers to be actively involved in partisan political affairs while serving on active duty. Winfield Scott was the Whig Candidate for President while serving as the Senior General in the United States Army; George Armstrong Custer was openly plotting a political career when he was killed at the Little Big Horn. In the 19th Century, Jackson, Harrison (both William Henry and Benjamin), Taylor, and Grant were elected because of their military service. In the 20th Century both Theodore Roosevelt and Dwight D. Eisenhower used their military service as proof of their ability to lead. Eisenhower was unique as he was recruited by both parties to run for President of the United States.
With the exception of Eisenhower and the man whom William Manchester referred to as the American Caesar Douglas MacArthur, for the most part the military has lived up to the example of Marshall in eschewing politics both when on active duty and in retirement.
Because the military is subordinate to the civil magistrates there are clearly limitations on active military participation in the political process. By tradition, regulation, and statue, the military is to eschew active participation in political activities. However, since the end of World War II and in particular since the end of the Vietnam War, the professional military has increasingly identified with the politics and polices of Republican Party. In the most recent election it was not unusual to see in the parking lots of a military installation cars with bumper stickers supporting Republican candidates. Thirty years ago when I entered the military it would have been the exception and not the rule to see partisan bumper stickers on a vehicle driven by a military member. Clearly while the ethos of non-partisanship remains a steadfast principal of the professional military, it is more honored than practiced.
There is no question that active participation in political activities while on active duty is prohibited. This does not mean a member of the military may not express his or her opinion either in private conversations or through a bumper sticker, the only cavet would be if he spoke in a contemptuous of the President or another member of the civilian chain of command.
What then is the option of a member of the military who disagrees with the policies of the government he or she serves? There are only two recourses; to continue to serve; or to seek discharge at the completion of an enlistment or to resign ones commission. Until separated from the military, a member is compelled to say nothing or if he or she chooses to speak out to face punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
There are those who will say the choices which I have stated previously deny those serving in the military the full exercise of their fundamental rights as a citizen. To those I would remind them of two points that by our tradition and our Constitution the military is subordinate to the Civil Magistrates; and two the military by its nature is hierarchical with those below having to obey the commands and support the decisions of their superiors. To allow otherwise would threaten the cohesion and the good order and discipline and inhibit the militarys ability to execute its mission of providing for "common defense." To allow the military to question the decisions of their superiors--the civil magistrates would erode the subordination of the military to the civil magistrates.
Those in the military while citizens, also serve the nation. Their fidelity is not to the President but "to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, [and] bear true faith and allegiance to the same." and to whomever, regardless of political party, is the Commander in Chief.
Now to the second question, which I shall frame, as is it right and proper for the members of the military who are discharged or retired to be involved in the political process.
Once either separated or retired a member of the military is free to participate in the political process. There are however some restrictions to ensure that the public does not construe the military is actively involved in politics. These restrictions include a prohibition on wearing a military uniform at a partisan political event.
The fact that one is either separate or retired from the military does not disqualify them from participation in politics. In fact some of our greatest political leaders were in fact formerly in the military is proof this is acceptable. However once a former member of the military enters the partisan political arena they become a politican.
In recent days six retired General Officers have called for the resignation of the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld; four of the 6 were directly involved in the invasion of Iraq, the other two, one was a former Central Command Commander and the other a former Senior Army Staff officer. The essence of all but Anthony Zinni's critique is as Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld has chosen to ignore the advice and consent of his Senior military officers; Zinni critiques is much broader in he is critical of the prosecution of the War on Terrorism.
The press, regardless of perspective has portrayed this as the "Revolt of the Generals." The left has shouted, "I told you so;" and the right has accused the Generals of being unpatriotic and endangering the lives of our servicemen serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It seems there are two essential questions which must be answered to determine which side is right. Are the General's right for speaking out, and are they wrong for demanding Secretary Rumsfeld resignation.
The first question is easy to answer, yes. If they feel strongly that mistakes have occurred, as citizens they have a right to speak out. Their bona fides is their service and position as retired military officers.
The second question is less easily answered. If the retired Generals are speaking out not as individuals but serving as the stalking horses for those still serving then they are wrong, for the military should not be involved in the political process. While it is true that senior officers are in fact politicans, they are not partisan politicans, rather they are politicans in the sense they must work with the elected and appointed political leaders to ensure the outcome they desire. If as retired General's they are representing the special interest of the military and are trying to change policies they disagree with then they are wrong. If on the other hand they are speaking out as individuals and are not representing the interest of the military but are merely expressing their own personnel views--then their actions are right and proper. How do we know what their motives are; we don't and we must leave it to their consciences to know what there true motives are.
In evaluating the General’s message, I believe it is important to look at what they did in the military and what they are saying. General Zinni position is that of a former Commander of Central Command. In that position he was in effect the Pro Counsel for the United States in the Middle East. The position of Regional Combatant Commander is more than just a military position; he represents the United States politically and diplomatically, is the point man for our getting the United States position out to the governments of the region, and has some influence regarding economic activities. Zinne was one of a long string of exceptional CENTCOM Commanders and as such his voice and views should be given great credence. He did not serve in the military under the Bush adminstration thus his criticism of the Secretary of Defense have more to do with the underlying policy issues than any specific concerns about Donald Rumsfeld. Part of Zinni critique may have to do with his belief that his detailed OPLAN for Iraq was scrapped by the SECDEF, at least this is the indication given in Cobra II by Gordon and Trainor.
Lieutenant General Newbold was the Director of Operations, J3 for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has first hand knowledge of the deliberations which took place leading up to execution of Cobra II. His position within the hierarchy of the military command required him to execute the orders of the Secretary of Defense. His criticism deal with the micro-management of the military planning and execution by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Defense's total disregard and disdain for the advice of his Senior Military leaders.
General Batiste criticism centered on the Secretary of Defense’s refusal to provide sufficient forces to secure the peace in Iraq. Batiste’s argument is the heart and soul of the military dissatisfaction with the Secretary of Defense. Rumsfeld persuaded General Tommy Frank that Iraq could be conquered with fewer than the 350K troops envisioned under General Zinni’s plan. Rumsfeld believed, that the military had become overly cautious and had taken to heart the Weinberger-Powell dictum that you only fight with overwhelming force. Rumsfeld was convinced that the Revolution in Military Affairs made it possible for military operations to be conducted with far less in the way of forces because of the technological advances in air delivered and electronic warfare system. In the weeks preceding the start of the ground war the Army Chief of Staff, Eric Shiniski opined that it would require several hundred thousand troops to secure Iraq. His opinion was dismissed by the civilian leaders of the Department of Defense as old thinking. Since that time, Shiniski has proven to be right and not Rumsfeld and his henchmen.
Rumsfeld public treatment of Shiniski and his and his assistants refusal to attend Shiniski’s retirement ceremony rankled the rank and file of the Army and to some extent the other services. Rumsfeld and cohorts are convinced that the future of warfare does not lie in large ground maneuver units but rather in sophisticated weapons systems which can eliminate the fog of war and replace the soldier on the ground. In order to pay for these weapons systems the largest single expense the Department of Defense must be reduced–personnel, thus leading to the belief that large ground combat units should be reduced and replaced by weapons systems.
So what is the General’s beef. Is it really with the course of the war or is it their fear that Rumsfeld is bent on replacing land forces as the centerpiece of America’s National Strategic power. I don’t think anyone really knows the answer, what I do know is if the General’s are sincere they would not use the specter of military mistakes to ensure the preservation of their vested interest of large ground maneuver forces. I do believe they are, and that their concerns are legitimate and are worth considering. I also believe that regardless Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld should not be removed simply because they say so. The decision to remove him rests entirely with the President, and any move to remove simply because the General’s say so is a threat to the constitutional underpinnings of our nation.
If I was to offer advice to Zinni et al, your criticism are valued and welcomed, however you should and must not interject yourself in the military into the political sphere of our nation. There is 200 plus years of tradition and history at stake. Duty, honor, and country and the watchwords of our professional military. Duty to ones profession, nation, and soldiers; honor in word and deed; and placing country before self. I believe each of these General’s is living up to these words through their action and their criticisms are legitimate, however their call for the replacement of the Secretary of Defense is wrong. There is a fine line between expressing one opinions and interjecting the specter of military involvement in the political process. The unintended consequences; whether it is undermining our Constitutional heritage, or the loss of respect the American public holds the military, or the American military becoming another special interest group.

Hank Foresman

Introduction

For the last thirty years I have served in the United States Army--I will soon retire. This blog is nothing more than my musing, thoughts, reflections, and war stories about the Army; past, present, and future. I hope you enjoy, and if you have comments feel free to contact me.

Hank