The Army in Crisis, One Soldiers Perspective
By LTC Henry J. Foresman, Jr.



It is clear, given recent developments inside the beltway, the current administration, is dissatisfied with the direction of the United States Army. Two developments, within the last week, have sent a strong message that the cultural mindset of the United States Army is out of step with the transformation mindset of the Department of Defense. The first development was the leaking of the intention of the Secretary of Defense, to appoint as the next Commander in Chief Europe (CINCEUR) (who is dual hated as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe) the incumbent Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. While the current CINCEUR (SACEUR) is a an Air Force Officer, during the last fifty years all but two of the CINCEUR (SACEUR) have been from the United States Army.

The second development was the leaking of the intention of the Secretary of Defense the name of the next Chief of Staff of the Army, General John Keane, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. The current Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki has over a year remaining as Chief of Staff. The fact the Secretary of Defense has made this decision and it has been leaked to the press, is a clear signal to the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the United States Army, the Secretary of Defense has lost confidence in the leadership and direction of the United States Army.

What has happened to the United States Army in the ten years since Desert Storm? Why does it find itself in a crisis of self? How can it regain it direction and how can it regain the trust and confidence of Secretary of Defense and once again become a leader with in the Department of Defense? I am not sure I have the answer, but I shall give perspective, based on twenty five years of service in the United States Army and the Army National Guard.

During the Cold War, it was the Army that was going to provide the bulk of the defense of Western Europe in support of NATO. The United States Army was focused on Europe and developed a Eurocentric mindset. It tactics, and its weapons systems were geared towards stopping the Soviet Union in a pitch battle on the plains of Europe. Desert Storm, while not on the plains of Europe, was a vindication of the Army’s vision and developments in weapons systems and doctrine since the end of World War II. The centerpiece of the Army was the Armored and Mechanized Infantry Divisions, with their ability to deliver deadly and accurate direct fires, provide deadly and responsive indirect fires, and to attack the enemy deep with Attack Helicopters. While the Army has always maintained a balance between light and heavy forces, it was the heavy force, from which the leaders of the Army emerged. The light forces, while capable in low and mid intensity conflict, and in the case of airborne units possessed capability of forced entry operations, they offered very little in the conduct of heavy combat.

Since the end of the Cold War and the victories in the Gulf, the Army has been searching for direction. It has held to its Euro-centric mindset, despite the fact that its potential adversaries are not in Europe but in the Near East and Asia. It has maintained its heavy forces, and has continued the development of weapons systems linked to fighting the Cold War adversary of the Soviet Union. The current Chief of Staff, General Shinseki has proposed and has pushed the transformation of the Army to a lighter and more mobile force, capable of force projection to any place in the World within ninety six hours. Rather than pushing a radical agenda of reshaping the Army now, he has proposed a more cautious and fiscally prudent course, which will transform a part of the Army while maintaining the so called “legacy” force as the Army develops the so called objective force. While I have applauded General Shinseki vision, he unfortunately in being cautious has damaged the Army. More importantly, he has failed to bring the Army along with his vision. In many cases, the entrenched bureaucracies of the Army Staff, and unwillingness of other leaders in the Army to embrace change have damaged his transformation.

As mentioned, the Army still intends to field weapons systems in the future which are Cold War legacies. The Crusader gun system is a prime example. An advanced field artillery system, while providing enhanced digital and fire on the move capability, in order to ensure crew survivability, it is a 40 ton monster. While it has some enhanced capabilities it does not increase the range which a 155MM artillery round can be fired. In that category it is on par with current field artillery systems,. Since the 1980’s the Army has had the MLRS, a tracked mounted Rocket Artillery system. Since the 1980’s the light Infantry Community has wanted a similar capability—a capability which will not be field until 2006, if then. The Army is currently fielding digitalized improved versions of the M1A1 Abrams and M2A1 Bradley in the III United States Army Corps. While greatly improving the ability of Commander’s at all levels to visualize the battlefield, the III Corps is unable to operate with other non digitalized units or units of other services.

No greater example exists of the Army’s inability to chart future visions, than in its Aviation modernization. In the last five years, the Army has had at least five different aviation modernization plans. In each case in has succumbed to either money or parochial infighting within the service. Army aviation is broken. It has an aging fleet, and the Army has not developed a vision for how to maintain that fleet, and to ensure it ability to fight and win the nations wars. Because of the lack of vision, the Reserve components, which make up fifty percent of the Army’s combat power, find themselves without attack aviation or air cavalry assets in its Divisions, and find itself without the sufficient assault and lift helicopters to perform their war time missions? The Army has hung its aviation star on the Comanche, which will combine the role of attack helicopter and scout helicopter in one airframe. This aircraft, is one variant or another, has been under development since 1983. In almost twenty years, the Army has not fielded this aircraft, nor will it be fielded until 2010. Almost thirty years to develop and field and aircraft is beyond comprehension. While the Army is seeking to maintain the technological and aircraft superiority, that the aircraft in the 1980’s gave it, it has failed to articulate a vision of what that aircraft is to do. The Comanche, while without a doubt one of the most technological advance aircraft in the world, was designed to fight the heavy tank centric battles of the Cold war. What the Army needs is helicopters, primarily lift and heavy lift which can move large numbers of troops and equipment around the battlefields of the third world. Battlefields that are not the flat plains of Europe or the deserts of the Middle East but rather the jungles of Asia and Africa, the mountainous terrain of Central Asia and Korea, the large, uninhabited deserts of Saharan Africa. These are the regions of the world where the battles of today and tomorrow will be fought.

While I do not subscribe to David Hackworth’s thesis that the leadership of the Army is rotten to the core, that they are Perfumed Princes; however, I do believe, he is correct that the Army has not rewarded those who are not bold, audacious, or even controversial. Case in point is what has happened to Colonel Doug MacGregor, who wrote a book on how to transform the Army, Breaking the Phalanx, unfortunately for Colonel MacGregor because his book questioned many long held beliefs in the Army, he threatened too many rice bowls and his career has been effectively sidetracked. Instead of putting in a position to Command an ACR or Brigade, he has been given a series of Staff Positions which will effectively prevent him from making General Officer. His sin was being forward looking, suggesting a new path for the Army and as such he was branded a heretic.

The problem facing the Army is not unlike what was faced by General George C. Marshall at the beginning of his tenure as Chief of Staff. What he found was an Army of entrenched thinking. It was said about many of the General’s and Senior Colonels in the Army in 1939, the last original thought they had was when they signed their name on the matriculation roll at West Point (Texas AM, VMI, Citadel take your pick). No greater example of this staid thinking which Marshall had to contend with was the belief among the Horse Cavalry that the Horse Cavalry was a viable weapon, despite what happened in World War I, the Spanish Civil War, and happened in Poland on the day he assumed the position of Chief of Staff. It was the Horse Cavalry community who delayed and prevented the Army from mechanizing between the wars (as well as Congress and their cheap approach to national security). The Horse Cavalry was determined they were going to prevent the Armor community from becoming the leading branch in the Army. George Marshall handled the problem deftly; he thanked the Colonel Bimp’s and General Idiots for their service, and sent them into retirement.

While the Army leadership often talks about “thinking outside the box” the truth is that the Army wants leaders who conform to the prevailing mindset. They want leaders whose approaches to leadership are down the middle and do not deviate from the cultural norms of the Army culture. They dare not be rebels, or different in any way. The day of an Officer being promoted to higher grades who has a mustache or has a reputation as a hard drinking, hard charging, skirt chasing, hell raising, warrior is gone. (I would argue that this is not a sexists comment, for there are officers of both sexes who meet this criteria, except for the female officer it would be pant chasing.)

Back to World War II, George Marshall, was dull, and led, by all accounts a very staid, right and proper life, however that did not preclude him for appointing as Senior Commander’s Officers whose activities were the very opposite of Marshall’s persona. George Patton, Vinegar Joe Stillwell, Douglas MacArthur, Hap Arnold, Dick Sunderland, and many others had eccentrics of character which would today discredit them from higher level command. Marshall’s golden rule was discretion is the better part of valor, therefore and officers who were discrete in their extracurricular activities were acceptable, however if a General Officers action became public knowledge it would cost them, either in a delay in promotion or early retirement.

This is not say the United States Army needs every officer to be a wander, lush, or general reprobate, but it does not hurt to have a few who live on the edge. General Don Starry, had a reputation of being a hard charging, swaggering Cavalryman, who was not afraid to speak his mind and ruffle a few feathers. Likewise, it was LTG Hank Emerson, whom the Army entrusted the responsibility of turning the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea around after it was disseminated by the Vietnam war was by all accounts a hard living Airborne Infantryman. For every Don Starry or Hank Emerson there is a Fred Franks, or Hugh Shelton who labor quietly without fanfare, but who left a positive mark on the Army.

Perhaps with a little greater intellectual rigor on the part of our General Officers then maybe we would have less group think. Who knows, maybe a few rebels will work their way to the top.

Written in 2001