Reserve Component Reform

Reforming the United States Army Reserve Components?
by COL Henry J. Foresman, Jr.
Section 1: Background

As part of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Guard Bureau, a Joint Bureau of the Department of the Army, and Department of the Air Force was created. Prior to the National Security Act of 1947, the National Guard Bureau had existed as a Bureau of the Department of War, its purpose was to provide training guidance and logistical oversight for Army National Guard units in each state and territory. Since the Dick Act of 1906 and the National Security Act of 1921 the United States Army had two Reserve Components; the Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve. The United States Army Reserve was created initially to provide Reserve Medical personnel for the Army in time of war, however because the Reserve, unlike the Army National Guard was not under the peacetime control of the Governors of the respective states and territories, the Regular Army over time expanded the size of the United States Army Reserve to include the full range of forces and capabilities found in the Regular Army and the Army National Guard. By creating the USAR the Regular Army hoped to create a force that more responsive to the needs of the Department of War and less influenced by partisan politics. The Army National Guard, through its lobbing organization, the National Guard Association of the United States, ensured that its supporters in Congress made it the dominant Reserve Component force in the United States Army. In the years between World War I and World War II, while there was little money for the military, the Army National Guard Association always ensured they got some equipment, whereas the United States Army Reserve often was undermanned and lacked any equipment to train with for their wartime mission.
In recent years the Army has had to rely increasingly on both the Army National Guard and United States Army Reserve as a source of manpower for a variety of military missions first in the Balkans, both in Bosnia and Kosovo; and now in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because of the large number of National Guard forces deployed some Governors have publicly complained that these deployments have left their states ill prepared to respond to state emergencies such as forest fires and natural disasters.
In the ongoing conflict in Iraq, the Army would not have been able to sustain the rotation of combat forces if it had not been for the combat formations of the Army National Guard, or sustain the fight without the combat support and combat service support from both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. But this has been painful as it required the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of citizen soldiers, disrupting their lives and it has involved massive expenditures of money and resources to train and outfit these units so they were on par with the Regular Army. It has not been without friction and there are those in the Regular Army who are already beginning the whisper campaign to strip the Army National Guard of all the combat formation and to put them in Regular Army. Whilst this is not likely to happen there will be a period following Iraq in which fingers are pointed and tempers lost over a debate that has gone on since the founding of our nation.
Section 2: Purpose
Rather than debating what is not possible, for Congress will never allow the Army to be large enough to accommodate all the combat formations in the Regular Army nor will the American people allow this to happen because of the historical ethos of distrust of large standing Armies. Rather, we should debate how to structure the Reserve Components to best support the national security of our nation. The purpose of this paper is to set forth a proposal for reform of the Reserve Components in the United States Army. It is radical paradigm shift from the present and both the National Guard Association and the Reserve Officers Association of the United States will be uncomfortable with it.
Section 3: Reform of the Army Reserve Components
In approaching reform of the Army Reserve Components, one must remember that for good or ill, the drafters of the Constitution, required that each state be allow a militia. The question which must be asked is how to accomplish reform of the Reserve Components of the United States Army so they are not only responsive to the Federal Government but also remain responsive to the needs of the respective states.
My proposal is very simple. We create two categories of militia, Federal and State, which is really no different than what exists today, but rather than having a Director of the Army National Guard reporting to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Chief of Staff of the United States Army and a Chief of Army Reserve who reports to the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, there will have a Director of Federal Militia (equivalent of the Chief of the Army Reserve) and a Director of the State Militia (equivalent of the Director of the Army National Guard). Both would report to the Chief of the Army National Guard Bureau who would report only to the Chief of Staff of the Army. While I have confined my discussion to the Army, a concurrent reform would be required in the United States Air Force along with a major rewrite of Title 10 and 32 United States Code in order to streamline the bureaucracy. My proposal, in effect would do away with the National Guard Bureau as it is know today, and constitute only an Army National Guard Bureau. My personnel belief is that with the Air Force a similar reorganization should take place but rather than referring to it as the Air National Guard Bureau all Air Force Reserve Components would be constituted in the United States Air Force Reserve.
The figure below is my take on how the Chief of the Army National Guard Bureau and associated Staff should be organized. Under the current system there are four distinct staffs in support of the Army Reserve Components; the National Guard Bureau (with representatives of both the Army and Air National Guard), the Army National Guard Staff, the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, and the United States Army Reserve Command. Under my reorganization, four staffs would be reduced to three. The Chief of the Army National Guard Bureau staff would combine the functions currently found in National Guard Bureau and the Chief of the Army Reserve. The current OCAR staff, USARC staff, and Army National Guard (Title 10) staffs would form the Staffs of the Director of Federal Militia and Director of State Militia. In order to bring functionality and synchronization to these staff, the Staffs associated with the Chief of the Army National Guard Bureau would be located at a military installation in close proximity to Washington DC. Ideal candidates would be Fort A. P. Hill, or Ft. Belvoir in Virginia and Fort Meade in Maryland.

Figure 1: Organization of the Army National Guard
Section 4: Composition of the Militias
Federal Militia:

The Federal militia would be organized identically to Active Component TO&E or TDA units. The types of units found in the Federal militia would be those required to support contingency or sustained military operations at all levels.:
· All Combat Army Formations (Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Attack Aviation, and Combat Engineers.)
· 50% of the Combat Heavy Engineers and non-construction EN units
· All Combat Divisions (UEx) Headquarters and Staffs
· Special Operations Forces
· Military Intelligence Units
· All MP IR and 50% of the MP Combat Support Units
· 50 % of the Assault Aviation, Medical Evacuation, and Heavy Lift Aviation
· All Forward Surgical Teams, Combat Support Hospitals and other critical medical assets
· All Sustainment Units of Action Headquarters for Division and Corps (UEx) and Army Headquarters (UEy)
· Civil Affairs
· PSYOPS
· 100% of the Simulation Units and 50% of the Training Units; Training Divisions would remain in the Federal Militia
· 75% of the Signal Assets
· 50% of the NBC Assets
· 25 % of the AG, Postal, and Finance Assets
· 50 % of the Transportation Assets
· 50% of QM assets

State Militia:
The State militia units would also be organized identically to Active Component TO&E and TDA units. The types of units found in the State Militia would give the respective Governors the maximum “Bang for the Buck” in responding to state emergencies or providing support to the Federal Government for natural or other disasters. (One of the provisions of any changes to Title 10 and 32 would include provisions for using units outside their home states to support natural or other disaster efforts in a State Militia status (equivalent to the current Title 32 status.)
· 50% of the Training Units
· 75% of the AG, Postal, and Finance Assets
· 50% of the Transportation Assets
· 50 % of the QM assets
· 50% of the NBC Assets
· 25 % of the Signal Assets
· All non critical medical assets
· 50 % of the Assault Aviation, Medical Aviation, and Heavy Lift Aviation
· 50% of the MP CS assets
· All State Headquarters (STARCS)
· Construction Engineers and other Engineer units such as utility detachments, utility detachments etc
· 50% Training Units
Section 5: Command and Control of the Militia
As structured today, the Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve have distinct Command and Control entities. The Army National Guard units answer to their respective State Adjutant General and receive support through the Joint Headquarters State. The United States Army Reserve receives its support through Regional Readiness Commands or Direct Reporting Units. Regardless of whether it is a Joint Headquarters State or Regional Readiness Command or Direct Reporting Unit, the functions of these headquarters are essentially the same.
In order to streamline Command and Control and Support for the Army National Guard, each State Adjutant General will exercise exclusive Command and Control over the State Militia (except when federalized) and will provide Title 10 support to both the Federal and State Militias in that State. The Senior Commander of Federal Militia forces in a State will exercise Command and Control over the Federal Militia. In order to make this palatable to Active Component, this will require that each Adjutant General be Federally Recognized as a General Officer who may be a retired Army General Officer or a member eligible to be nominated as a General Officer in the Federal militia. The TAG while Federally recognized will be the only General Officer in each respective states militia. It will require that requirements for promotions, assignments, etc for both the Federal and State militia be exactly the same. While the respective states have a Constitutional right to appoint their officers in order to ensure standardization and compliance with Statutory Law and Regulatory guidance promotions and assignments must be made by common criteria. By centralizing the so called “Title 10” responsibilities under one headquarters it should eliminate duplication of effort, and provide efficiencies of effort and fiscal discipline for both the Federal and State militia.
There are currently two separate and distinct systems for managing Reserve Component soldiers. Any reform must streamline management of Reserve Component soldiers, both officer and enlisted. First and foremost every soldier will be enlisted in the Army National Guard of the United States; those who chose to enter the State Militia force will have a dual enlistment, just as those in the National Guard have today. For those in the Federal Militia they will have the option of being enlisted in the inactive State Militia. This will enable soldiers in either the Federal or State Militia to transfer from one militia to the other. All soldiers regardless of whether they are in the Federal or State Militia will be supported by the “State Headquarters.” The State Headquarters will be responsible for paying, promoting, and processing personnel actions, it will provide clothing and equipment, and will be responsible for managing the training, mobilization, demobilization, and recruiting of both the Federal and State militia. It should improve efficiency and responsiveness for all soldiers regardless of whether they are in the Federal or State Militia.
The Adjutant General’s being Federally Recognized, will still be subject to the appointment of the Governor of their respective state, however minimal qualification will be established to ensure that only those who are qualified are appointed to this position. TAGs will continue to be paid by their respective states, however because they are Federally Recognized General Officers they will be held responsible to ensure that the members of both the Federal and State militias are properly supported. Furthermore upon promotion to General Officer State Militia Officers (except for the TAG) shall be automatically transferred to the Federal Militia. All General Officer Billets in the State Militia, except for the TAG will be coded to be filled only by a Federal Militia General Officer.
Below is how the Command and Control should look, what needs to be empathized is while TAGs will be responsible for support to the Federal Militia they will not have Command authority over the Federal Militia unless so directed by the President of the United States.

Figure 2: Command and Control
Section 6: Readiness, Training and Mobilization
By creating a Federal and State Militia force, the Army will be able to establish priorities for Readiness Levels and Training for Federal and State militia units and ensure that each unit is properly trained and equipped to perform their primary mission.
Organization, Equipping, and Full Time Manning:
Those units in the Federal Militia would be resourced and authorized manning at C1; they would be equipped with the same equipment as the Regular Army and would routinely conduct training exercises with Active Components units. Federal Militias would be authorized 100% of Full Time Manning, which will be sourced by Active Guard and Reserve Soldiers. Within the Federal Militia there would be no military technicians.
Those units in the State Militia would be resourced and authorized manning no higher than C2 but no lower than C3. State militia units would be equipped with comparable equipment as the Regular Army and would not normally conduct training exercises with Active Component units. The State militia would be authorized 80% (C2) of their Full Time manning which would be sourced exclusively by military technicians. The State Headquarters in each State would be exclusive manned, with the exception of the Statutory Position of United States Property and Fiscal Officer with military technicians.
Readiness and Training:
Since the end of the Gulf War, the United States Army has been required by Statue to provide enhanced Training advisors to the Reserve Components. Commonly referred to as “Title 11” duty it has required the program personnel to support the Reserve Components. Clearly these individuals are enhanced the readiness of the Reserve Components but at a cost to the Active Component. Given the Operational Tempo which the Army is experiencing, there needs to clearly be a better way of ensuring that the RC are properly trained and advised.
The model which the Army should consider is what is currently used by the United States Marine Corps. Rather than creating separate and distinct units, the Army should assign Active Component Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers to actual positions within the Federal Militia. For example in each of the Federal Militia Brigade Combat Teams, the Deputy Commander would be an active component Colonel, he would be assisted by other active component officers who were assigned to each BCT both at the Brigade Headquarters and also in each of the Battalions. But there would be a trade off—for each active component Soldier assigned to the BCT, an Active Guard and Reserve soldier or Drilling member of the Unit on an extended tour of Active Duty would be assigned to the same position in an Active Component BCT. This would ensure that the Active Component was engaged in the Training and Readiness of the Federal Militia, but more importantly by requiring Federal Militia soldiers to be assigned against Active Component position would expose the Federal Militia to the best in the Army and would help the Army learn something about the strengths of the Reserve Components.
Over time this infusion of Active Component Soldiers into the Federal Militia should result in better overall training, readiness of soldiers and equipment, and should ensure that at all levels of the Federal Militia the units are trained and ready to conduct their mission. This will have a corresponding effect on the amount of time a unit requires upon mobilization before they deploy in support of military operations..
The State Militia, the Army should continue to provide some training and readiness oversight to ensure they are prepared to support both Homeland Security and State and Federal Emergency Response missions. The State Militia would not normally be mobilized for missions other than either Homeland Security or Emergency Response missions.
This is not to say they could never be mobilized to support military operations. They could, but only when all the Federal Militia assets had been exhausted. Additionally when mobilizing a State Militia unit, the Department of the Army would have to designate a like or comparable unit as a replacement for the mobilized State Militia unit and transfer the Federal Militia from the Federal Militia to the State Militia. This would apply to all types of Federal Militia units except for Combat Arms—as Combat Army units would always remain under the Direct Command and Control of the Department of the Army through the Army National Guard Bureau and the Director of the Federal Militia.
Mobilizing:
In determining what units of the Federal Militia should be mobilized and to provide some predictability for its members, the Federal Militia should be organized into groupings of Force Packages. Each of the force packages would contain and equal distribution of units found in the Federal Militia and would ensure that in a given year the Federal Militia could provide the numbers and types of units required by the Army for mobilization.
In addition to providing predictability Force Packages would assist commanders in prioritizing training for their units. The example below is based on a model of eight years. This is an arbitrary number it could be any number that was agreed upon by the Chief of the Army National Guard Bureau and the United States Army.

Figure 3: One Example of Predictable Deployment Cycle
Section 7: Why the Change?
Under Donald Rumsfeld the watchword inside the Department of Defense has been transformation. The United States Army, beginning during the tenure of General Eric Shinseki and accelerating under the tenure of General Peter Schoomaker, is undergoing the most profound transformation since World War II. The goal of this transformation is to shape the Army to be more “operational flexibility and adaptability—attributes of Army forces with balanced capabilities. It requires Army forces to sustain a consistently high readiness level. There will be no time to “ramp up” to meet a crisis. Maintaining this readiness level while fighting the War on Terrorism requires a long-term commitment—of both resources and will—by the Nation as well as the Army. These differences form the basis of today’s challenge.”[1] Clearly the bifurcated Reserve Component structure which served the United States Army well during the Cold War needs to be changed. By having a majority of the forces of the Reserve Component under the control of the Governor’s of the respective states is neither efficient nor responsive. It denies the Army the ability to provide the necessary Command oversight to ensure the force is ready. But our Constitution demands that a part of the militia remain under the control of the Governors of the respective states. It demands that a Force tailored to support the types of emergencies most likely to confront the States be available to the Governors. Clearly transformation demands that the structure of the Reserve Components be examined and a new paradigm for the twenty-first century be considered.
What I have proposed does that—is simplifies the Command and Control of the Federal Militia giving the Regular Army more oversight and influence in its readiness and training but at the same time provides the Governor’s the types of forces they will need in State Emergencies and the types of units most useful to the Federal Government in situation similar to Hurricane Katrina. As we have seen in the recent weeks, with the events of Hurricane Katrina, the need for dedicated forces to respond to state level emergency has not lessened and in some respects given the growth of our nation in urban clusters it may become more imperative in the years ahead.
This is a radical solution and will not necessarily sit well with those who wish to preserve the Status Quo Ante Bellum. September 11, 2001 fundamentally alter the world as we knew it. The nations need for a dedicate force to support the United States military has increased as we have taken the war against Global Terrorism to both Afghanistan and Iraq; but the United States need for a force to respond to attack such as September 11, 2001 or natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina has not diminished. What I have proposed will ensure that our nation has an Army Reserve Component force that can properly do both missions.


Author Note: This is a conceptual plan that will require a great deal more work to flesh out the ideas and to identify the second and third order consequences. I believe the time is right, given the discussions at the most recent National Governor’s conference to address these fundamental issues. Preserving the Status Quo is fine as long as the Status Quo gives the nation what it needs, if it does not then we must look to change—I believe current system is failing the nation and that change is warranted.
[1] United States Army, Field Manual 1, 14 June 2005, p. 1-10.