Review of Supreme Command

This was written in November 2002.

Supreme Command; Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, Eliot A. Cohen, The Free Press, New York, New York, 2002, 288 pages.


A quick read of the Washington Post or The New York Times in recent weeks and months will see quite often the name of Eliot A. Cohen. Mr. Cohen is an academic. He has experience both as a reserve military officer and a former political appointee in the Department of Defense. He is the favorite academic of his mentor Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfweitz and his boss Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and other members of the neo-conservative cabal who advise President Bush. Mr. Cohen work on the relationship between the military and civilian leadership is a must read by all who wish to profess a knowledge of current military thought and strategy. His work, somewhat modeled on Gerhardt Ritter’s seminal work on the relationship between the German General Staff and the Kaiser, The Sword and the Scepter, will never achieve that works reputation for heft and breath of scholarship and analysis.
Mr. Cohen’s thesis is that the proper relationship between the civil and military is one of which the military is subservient to civil authority. He cites as his examples Lincoln’s relationship with the Union Army in the Civil War, Clemenceau relationship with the French Army in World War I, Churchill’s relationship with the British Army in World War II, and finally David Ben Gurion’s relationship with the Israeli General Staff in the 1948 War for Independence. While one in theory would like to agree that at all times and in all places the military should be totally subservient to civil authority, reality, pragmatic common sense and experience have demonstrated time and time again it is balance between military and civil authority which achieves success.
In each of the examples cited by Mr. Cohen, the civilian leader was forced by circumstance to impose his will onto the actions of the military to ensure the survival of his nation. Lincoln actions of bolstering the military, providing grand strategy, and creating the political conditions for success guaranteed the survival of the United States. Clemenceau rose to power after the failure of Anglo French military strategy, revolution in the ranks over the lack of leadership by Senior French Officers, and the fear among French politicians that without change, France would soon follow Russia into the abyss of revolution. Churchill became Prime Minister at a time when the forces of the United Kingdom had been routed from continental Europe, and were being attacked throughout the empire. Britain stood alone, as the United States was not committed to war. Churchill was forced to ensure that the United Kingdom could survive until such time as a grand coalition could be formed to defeat the menace of Germany—survival required that the British Military be forced to do what they believed was impossible. David Ben Gurion offers an example of the civilian leader whose actions ensure not only the survival of Israel, but who brought together the disparate parts of the Zionist resistance movement to form a cohesive and effective military.
In using these examples, Mr. Cohen has created a model for civil military relationships, in which the experience, the professionalism, and cultural mores of the uniformed military are ignored in favor of desires of the transient political leadership of military. The model offered by Mr. Cohen, is a model which works well in time of crisis but seeks to alienate the uniformed military from the society it is sworn to serve.
What then should be the relationship between civil and military authority. This is a question for which Eliot Cohen has offered one model. While Cohen alludes to the various models of civil military relations, it is worth noting that his model; when carried out by civilian leaders of ability but who lack the necessary leadership skills or whose judgment is shaped by narrow political desires; these civilian leaders can lead the military down an ill conceived path of destruction. There are two examples of where this model has failed the state; Hitler’s rise to power in World War II, and the management style of Robert Strange McNamara in the 1960’s, in which the United States Military was destroyed on the altar of political expediency. This is not however to argue for a military which dominates civil authority, for as Gerhardt Ritter showed in the Sword and Scepter, when this happens the military will lead civil authority down a road ending in the destruction of the state.
What then is the proper relationship between civil and military authority. This is a question, which philosophers have debated for years. John Locke, in his 2nd Treatise on Government—set forth a model of government and the military being subservient to the will of the people. Locke’s perspective was that of a country Whig, who wish to no repeat of the disasters caused by either the inept leadership of civil and military authority as occurred under the House of Stuart or draconian leadership of Cromwell’s Commonwealth. Locke’s 17th Century view of the proper relationship between civil and military authority is discussed in light of the American experience by Madison and Hamilton in the Federalists Papers.
The essence of this model is balance. Balance between the need for the military to be subservient to civil authority, and the need for civil authority to recognize that the members of the military are not only professionals but also fellow citizens, whose allegiance like all citizens is to the Constitution and the Nation. The best examples of that relationship are found in the leadership of both Roosevelt’s and of Ronal Reagan. Each these men clearly had a vision of what was best for the nation, and each clearly understood that the military had not only a constitutional but a moral obligation to support their vision, however each allowed the military to bring to bear their professional judgment, their understanding of their institutions, and their experience to shape the course of military strategy.
The relationship, as described by Forrest Pogue in his multi-volume biography of George C. Marshall, between Marshall and Franklin D. Roosevelt offers, in my opinion the best example of the proper balance between civil and military authority.
In Marshall, Roosevelt the supreme politician, found his equal. Marshall was apolitical and therefore not a threat to the reign of FDR, however he was a supreme staff officer and was not afraid to give his honest opinion on matters of concern. Roosevelt was also served by his other appointments during World War II, Leahy offered an individual who was admire by all in the military, King while caustic nevertheless was the right man to rebuilt the U. S. Navy after the debacle at Pearl Harbor, and Vandergrift rewarded a true warrior, gentleman, and hero for his service, but it was Marshall who held that special place and who set the tone for the civil military relations during World War II. Marshall never an intimate of Roosevelt, the one time which Roosevelt attempted to breach the fine line between a Commander in Chief and a subordinate, Marshall forcefully but quietly and with dignity let it be know what the proper relationship was. In doing this he made it clear that he and the military were subordinate to civil authority, were not to be treated as political hacks, and that their advice and consent was an important part in formulating the grand strategy of World War II. From then on, Roosevelt relied on the good judgment of George C. Marshall, who among all military officers in World War II was the first among equals in Roosevelt’s mind.
Having said all of this, I must wonder if Eliot Cohen’s conclusions were shaped by the desires of his mentor Paul Wolfweitz and his boss Donald Rumsfeld to reshape the military. Cohen’s analysis has been cited by some of the neo-conservative cabal as justification for Donald Rumsfeld draconian actions in reining in the power of the Joint Staff, the Service Chiefs, and to some extent the Combatant Commanders. Whether or not this was just a matter of timing or whether it was consciences decision, nevertheless Mr. Cohen’s book and thesis has served as a basis for the domination of American military by the civilian leadership. The question is whether it was necessary, and whether or not this book and the underlying philosophy are merely means for the justification by political appointees for certain actions. That remains to be seen.

Henry J. Foresman, Jr.; Friday, November 29, 2002
Lieutenant Colonel, Army National Guard of the United States